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I. INTRODUCTIONA S a whole "the predominant aim of [whistleblower] legislation is
to protect employees who report the illegal, immoral or other-
wise illegitimate conduct of their employers from reprisal.", To
incentivize employees to report and to punish employers who retaliate
against those employees, Canadian legislation provides protections such
as guarantees of confidentiality and internal processes "to deal with repri-
sals and threats of reprisal." 2 When compared to other nations, however,
Canada's whistleblower protection is minimal at best.3 Because Cana-
dian whistleblower legislation only provides the "barest protection from
reprisals it will come as no surprise that employees are often reluctant to
openly report employer transgressions." 4
In order to incentivize employees to report misconduct and to provide
greater protection when they do report, the Ontario Securities Commis-
sion (OSC) has recently implemented a new whistleblower protection
program.5 On July 14, 2016, the OSC announced the creation of the Of-
fice of the Whistleblower and the implementation of "the first paid
whistleblower program by a securities regulator in Canada."6 The policy,
which was first introduced in October 2015,7 makes "Ontario the first
Canadian jurisdiction to offer cash rewards of up to $5 million to
whistleblowers."8 As explained in the corresponding OSC Policy state-
1. Adrian Ishak, State of Whistleblowing Legislation in Canada, CANADIAN LABOUR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.1abourandemploymentlaw.com/
2014/11/state-of-whistleblowing-legislation-in-canada/.
2. Id.
3. See Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada,
RoCHON GENOVA (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.rochongenova.com/blog/2015/11/
trends-in-whistleblowing-laws-across-canada.shtml.
4. Ishak, supra note 1.
5. See Whistleblower Program, OSC Policy 15-601 at 1 (July 14, 2016).
6. Ontario Securities Commission Office of the Whistleblower, OSC Launches Office
of Whistleblower, OSC (July 14, 2016), http://www.osc.gov.on.calen/home.htm.
7. Drew Hasselback & Barbara Shecter, OSC Raises Whistleblower Payout Cap to $5
Million as Reward for Helping Ferret Out Wrongdoing, FP STREET (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/osc-raises-whistleblower-payout-
cap-to-5-million-as-reward-for-helping-ferret-out-wrongdoing.
8. Drew Hasselback, Ontario Securities Commission Will now pay up to $5 Million
for Tips as First in Canada to Offer Whistleblower Rewards, FP STREET (July 14,
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ment, the "powerful addition to [Ontario's] enforcement arsenal and
game-changer for securities enforcement in Canada,"9 allows individuals
to "report information on serious securities- or derivatives-related mis-
conduct to the Commission" in exchange for whistleblower award
eligibility.10
Although this reward amount brings Canada more in line with coun-
tries such as the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion program, several lawyers have pointed to obvious issues with the
program, including its negative effect on internal reporting, believing that
the program will only incentivize and increase the number of "blindside
allegations."" Additionally, the Law Society of Upper Canada, has ex-
pressed concerns that the program will place internal counsel at odds with
the Law Society Rules of Conduct, leaving very little room for the award
to have the effects that the OSC desires. 12
In exploring the possible ramifications of the OSC's new program, this
paper will begin with a brief overview of the history of whistleblower
legislation in Canada, including a brief analysis of how Canadian courts
have dealt with whistleblower legislation. Next, the creation of the OSC's
Office of the Whistleblower and the corresponding policy statement will
be considered, focusing specifically on what have been called "structural
shortcomings" 1 3 as well as predictions for the program's success.
II. HISTORY OF WHISTLEBLOWER LEGISLATION
IN CANADA
Compared to the whistleblower protection legislation that is available
in other countries, many lawyers argue that "Canada lags significantly
behind." 1 4 The following section will give a brief overview of the "patch-
work"1 5 of protection provided under Canadian whistleblower legislation,
beginning with a look at what protections are available for public service
and private sector employees. Finally, it will conclude with a brief analy-




9. OSC Office of the Whistleblower, supra note 6.
10. Whistleblower Program, supra note 5.
11. David Dias, Lawyer Concerned with Blindside Allegations Under OSC Whistle-
blower Program, CANADIAN LAWYER (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.canadianlawy-
ermag.com/legalfeeds/2956/lawyer-concerned-about-blindside-allegations-under-
osc-whistleblower-program.html.
12. See Alex Robinson, New Awards Policy for Whistleblowers Under Fire, LAW TIMES
NEws (July 11, 2016), http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201607115518/headline-news/
new-awards-policy-for-whistleblowers-under-fire.
13. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, ROCHON
GENOVA (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.rochongenova.com/blog/2015/11/trends-in-
whistleblowing-laws-across-canada.shtml.
14. Id.
15. Adrian Ishak, State of Whistleblowing Legislation in Canada, CANADIAN LAB3OUR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.labourandemploymentlaw.com/
2014/11i/state-of-whistleblowing-legislation-in-canada/.
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A. PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES
The major piece of federal Canadian legislation that shields those in
public service from the negative implications of whistleblowing, the Pub-
lic Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) was passed in 2007.16
The stated purpose of the PSDPA is "to establish a procedure for the
disclosure of wrongdoings in the public sector."1 7 In doing so, the Act
strives to "achieve an appropriate balance between" the "duty of loyalty"
and the "freedom of expression" that public servants are both bound by
and enjoy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.18
Under the framework of the PSDPA, it is the responsibility of the chief
executive to "establish internal procedures to manage disclosures made
under [the] Act by public servants employed in the portion of the public
sector for which the chief executive is responsible." 19 These internal pro-
cedures must "protect the identity of persons involved in the disclosure
process" and must adequately "ensure the confidentiality of information
collected in relation to disclosures of wrongdoings." 2 0 A public servant
who wishes to make a disclosure may do so to "his or her supervisor or to
the senior officer designated for the purpose by the chief executive." 21 If
the disclosure has been made pursuant to the PSDPA, then the Act pro-
hibits any "reprisals" taken against the public servant. 22
As the only "freestanding federal whistleblower legislation" in Canada,
the PSDPA is strong evidence that Canada does in fact "lag significantly
behind" other countries in terms of the breadth and availability of
whistleblower protection. 23 For example, the United States implemented
The Civil Service Reform Act, its first whistleblower law, in 1978, and
since then the availability of protection for whistleblowers has only grown
wider and more readily available through various pieces of federal legis-
lation.2 4 Additionally, most American states grant similar protections to
their employees and "since 2010 [the SEC has] paid out in excess of US
$50 million." 25 By contrast, provincially, "only six [Canadian] provinces
have legislation which provides protection to civil servant
whistleblowers." 26
16. Hoque, supra note 13.
17. Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46.
18. Id.
19. Id. at s. 10(1).
20. Id. at s. 11(1)(a)-(b); see also Yosie Saint-Cyr, The State of Whistleblowing in Ca-
nada, SLAW (June 6, 2013), http://www.slaw.ca/2013/06/06/the-state-of-whistleblow
ing-in-canada/.
21. Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46, s. 12.
22. Id. at s. 19.
23. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, ROCHON
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B. PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES
Even though the protection for public sector whistleblowers under Ca-
nadian legislation is minimal compared to what is available in other coun-
tries, "the protections that have developed for [these] public sector
employees are vastly more robust than those afforded to employees in
the private sector." 2 7 For example, compared to the six provinces that
have enacted legislation to protect employees in the public sector, only
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick have their own provincial legislation
to protect private sector employees. 28 Outside of this provincial legisla-
tion employees in the private sector are often forced to "turn to patch-
work legislation, which tends to focus on specific misconduct and then
only to limited channels of communication." 29 Two places where employ-
ees in the private sector can turn for protection are the Criminal Code
and the Canada Labour Code, both of which are fairly limited in scope.30
Similar to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States, section 425.1 of
the Criminal Code broadly "prohibits employers from retaliating or
threatening to take action against employees who provide information to
law enforcement officials"31 making any such employer "guilty of an in-
dictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years." 32 However, the text of section 425.1 greatly limits its scope and
application, and as will be seen in the later section, courts are reluctant to
construe this provision broadly. 33 For example, it only applies when the
employee provides or intends to "provide information to a person whose
duties include the enforcement of federal or provincial law," and it only
applies to an "offence that the employee believes has been or is being
committed contrary to this or any other federal provincial Act or regula-
tion." 34 Therefore, if employees report to a source other than law en-
forcement, such as "a media source or an outside agency or advocacy
group," they are not given any protection and the employers are free to
retaliate without threat of imprisonment or fine.3 5
Additionally, the Canada Labour Code provides "protections for em-
ployees who give information to an inspector, testify against their em-
ployers, or have sought enforcement of the Code." 36 However, much like
the Criminal Code, the application of the Labour Code in relation to
27. Adrian Ishak, State of Whistleblowing Legislation in Canada, CANADIAN LABOUR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.Iabourandemploymentlaw.com/
2014/11/state-of-whistleblowing-legislation-in-canada/.
28. Yosie Saint-Cyr, The State of Whistleblowing in Canada, SLAW (June 6,2013), http:/
/www.slaw.ca/2013/06/06/the-state-of-whistleblowing-in-canada/.
29. Ishak, supra note 27.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 425.1(2)(a).
33. See Anderson v. IMIT-Quebec Inc., [2013] FCA 90.
34. Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. s. 425.1(1)(a); see also Ishak, supra note 27.
35. Yosie Saint-Cyr, The State of Whistleblowing in Canada, SLAW (June 6,2013), http:/
/www.slaw.ca/2013/06/06/the-state-of-whistleblowing-in-canada/.
36. Michael Torrance, Global CSR Monitor - Whistleblower Protections and CSR,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (May 27, 2010), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
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whistleblowers is limited in that it only applies to employees "who seek
enforcement of, or are participating in proceedings or inquiries under, the
Canada Labour Code."37 In cases where the employer is found guilty of
"discharg[ing], threat[ening] to discharge or otherwise discriminat[ing]"
against a whistleblower employee, he can be "liable on summary convic-
tion" for fines ranging from $10,000 to $250,000.38
Because of the "patchwork" nature of the available protections for
those in the private sector, the new OSC policy could potentially have the
greatest effects on the public sector. However, as will be explored later,
the new policy is nevertheless still plagued with shortcomings and logisti-
cal problems that many argue will prevent it from being as successful as it
could be.
C. COURT TREATMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWER
LEGISLATION IN CANADA
Canadian courts have also dealt with whistleblower legislation,
"do[ing] little to protect whistleblowers" or those who are critical of their
employers. 39 For example in, Fraser v. P.S.S.R.B., the Supreme Court of
Canada, made it clear that in "striking an appropriate balance between
the right of the individual to speak freely and the duty of the . . . public
servant to fulfill his functions properly," 40 "the interest in the actual an'd
apparent impartiality of the public service justified an increased duty of
loyalty on the part of public servants." 41 The case involved the discharge
of Mr. Neil Fraser who worked for the Revenue Canada, Taxation for ten
years. 4 2 In 1982, Mr. Fraser began to publicly comment on "the Govern-
ment's policy on metric conversion," criticizing the Government's posi-
tion in the Kingston Whig-Standard and appearing on a Kingston radio
station to do the same. 4 3 After he was given several warnings and sus-
pensions, on February 22, 1982, Mr. Fraser was terminated from his posi-
tion at Revenue Canada. 4 4 In challenging his termination Mr. Fraser
argued that the "Adjudicator erred in holding that his criticism of govern-
ment policies, unrelated to the work of his department could form the
basis for disciplinary action." 45 The Court concluded that "free speech or
expression by the public servant is not an absolute, unqualified value and
may be modified by a competing interest," and in this case the loyalty
knowledge/publications/44863/global-csr-monitor-whistleblower-protections-and-
csr.
37. Ishak, supra note 27.
38. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2, s. 256 (1), 1.1.
39. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, RocHON
GENOVA (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.rochongenova.com/blog/2015/11/trends-in-
whistleblowing-laws-across-canada.shtml.
40. Fraser v. P.S.S.R.B. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455.
41. Hoque, supra note 39.
42. Fraser, 2 S.C.R. 455, at para. 2.
43. Id. at para. 3, 6.
44. Id. at para. 9.
45. Id. at para. 17.
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that Mr. Fraser owed to the government as a public servant was greater
than his right to speak and criticize the government freely.46 Ultimately,
the Court's decision meant that when openly and publicly criticizing the
government, public servants "voluntarily assume the risk" that their con-
duct might open them up to termination or disciplinary action. 47
Courts have also stressed the importance of "exhaust[ing] internal
whistleblowing mechanisms before going public." 4 8 For example, in An-
derson v. IMTT-Quebec Inc., the Federal Court of Appeal of Quebec nar-
rowly interpreted section 425.1 of the Criminal Code as to not apply to
the underlying facts of the case, focusing instead on the importance of
internal resolution and loyalty.4 9 The case involved an employee at
IMTT- Qudbec who was dismissed for what he claimed were "actions he
had taken to ensure the safety of IMTT workers."5 0 The Court sided
with the employer, who claimed that the employee was terminated be-
cause of "permanent breakdown of the relationship of trust resulting
from the applicant's clear lack of loyalty and disrepute he had caused the
company." 5 1 In reaching its decision, the Court made clear that "[t]he
purpose of section 425.1 of the Criminal Code is not to allow an em-
ployee to make with impunity, reckless complaints to the public authori-
ties and without regard for the employer's internal mechanisms." 52 The
Court drew their focus on internal reporting from the earlier decision in
Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 77.53 In Merk, Justice Binne stressed the
benefits of "encourag[ing employees] to resolve the problems internally,"
arguing that such an "up the ladder approach has also been favored by
courts and other labour arbitrators." 54
III. CURRENT WHISTLEBLOWER LEGISLATION IN
CANADA: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSC POLICY
As mentioned above, on July 14, 2016, the OSC announced the crea-
tion of the Office of the Whistleblower and published OSC Policy 15-
601.55 The creation of the Office marks the "first paid whistleblower pro-
gram by a securities regulator in Canada." 56 The motivation behind the
new OSC program as described by new Chief of the OSC's Office of the
46. Id.
47. Id. at para. 52.
48. George Avraam & Cherrine Chow, Whistleblower Protection: The Importance of
Internal Policies, CANADIAN FRAUD LAw (May 12, 2014), http://www.canadian-
fraudlaw.com/2014/05/whistleblower-protection-the-importance-of-internal-poli-
cies/.
49. See Anderson v. IMIT-Quebec Inc., [2013] F.C.A. 90, at paras. 38-40.
50. Id. at para. 2, 7.
51. Id. at para. 19.
52. Id. at para. 44.
53. See id. at para. 39.
54. Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforc-
ing Iron Workers, Local 77, [2005] S.C.C. 70, at para. 23-24.
55. Whistleblower Program, OSC Policy 15-601 at 1 (July 14, 2016).
56. Id.
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Whistleblower was to "change the stigma of whistleblowing." 57 To
achieve this goal, the OSC created a program to reward whistleblowers
"for the personal and professional risks that they take in coming for-
ward."5 8 To be protected under the new rewards program, employees
must "report information on serious securities- or derivatives-related mis-
conduct . . . to the Commission."59 After "certain eligibility criteria"60
are met, it is then up to the OSC "to determine how much a
whistleblower can collect within a range of five to 15 percent of any sanc-
tions imposed or collected by the regulator, capped at $5 million." 6 1 The
following sections will look further into the details of the new program,
focusing on what critics are calling "structural shortcomings" 6 2 as well as
predictions for problems the program will create.
A. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE OSC PROGRAM
Although many agree that the OSC program is a step in the right direc-
tion toward enhancing the protection options for Canadian
whistleblowers, critics have pointed to several "structural shortcomings"
of the new OSC program. 63 For example, the OSC program offers no
provision to provide "leniency for the culpable whistleblower's role in the
misconduct." 64 Unlike the SEC's program which "offers leniency..to
whistleblowers who are involved in the improper activities they uncov-
ered," those who report under the OSC program run the risk of opening
themselves up to liability, decreasing the likelihood that they will report
misconduct. 65 Additionally, the OSC program only offers rewards on tips
that uncover actual wrongdoing. 66 This means that "[a] tipster who pro-
vided information that is found to be misleading or untrue cannot receive
a reward," and will likely be terminated from his job. 6 7
Perhaps an even greater shortcoming is the program's alleged guaran-
tee of confidentiality. The language of the corresponding OSC policy
statement reveals that all that is promised to whistleblowers is that the
57. Drew Hasselback, Ontario Securities Commission Will now pay up to $5 Million





59. Whistleblower Program, supra note 55.
60. Id.
61. Hasselback, supra note 57.
62. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, RoctIoN





66. Drew Hasselback & Barbara Shecter, OSC Raises Whistleblower Payout Cap to $5
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"Commission Staff will make all reasonable efforts to keep the identity of
the whistleblower, and information that could be reasonably expected to
reveal the whistleblower's identity confidential." 6 8 This weak guarantee
is also subject to two "rather broad" 69 exceptions, allowing disclosure of
the "whistleblower's identity, in connection with an administrative pro-
ceeding . .. in order to permit a respondent to make full answer or de-
fence," as well as "when Commission Staff determines that it is necessary
for the purposes of the Act . . . to disclose the information to any of the
entities listed in section 153 of the Act.70 While those reporting miscon-
duct are allowed to hire a lawyer to complete the submission form for
them,7 1 "anonymity can only be guaranteed at the reporting stage." 72 Se-
curities Litigator Linda Fuerst points out that the "OSC can't give any
ironclad guarantees of anonymity," because "in the event that allegations
lead to charges and subsequent proceedings, the defendant will have a
right to disclosure." 73 Further, it is important to note that if the case falls
apart, which is likely to happen if the whistleblower remains anonymous,
the possibility of a reward may also "fall apart." 74
B. PREDICTIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE OSC PROGRAM
In addition to the "structural shortcomings"7 5 of the program, critics
have pointed to several possible issues with the implementation of the
program, giving it a rather weak prediction of success. The two major
issues that critics foresee include conflicts with lawyer-client confidential-
ity and an increase of blindside allegations. 76 Issues regarding confidenti-
ality are specifically concerned with how the new OSC policy will relate
to internal counsel, who as lawyers are held to different ethical stan-
dards.7 7 Under the Law Society of Upper Canada's Rules of Professional
Conduct, lawyers are expected to "hold in strict confidence all informa-
tion concerning the business and affairs of the client acquired in the
course of professional relationship."7 8 While lawyers are not allowed to
"knowingly assist in or encourage any dishonesty, fraud, crime or illegal
68. Whistleblower Program, OSC Policy 15-601 at 6 (July 14, 2016).
69. Hoque, supra note 62.
70. Whistleblower Program, supra note 68.
71. Id. at 4.
72. David Dias, Lawyer Concerned with Blindside Allegations Under OSC





75. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, RoCHON
GENOVA (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.rochongenova.com/blog/2015/11/trends-in-
whistleblowing-laws-across-canada.shtml.
76. See Dias, supra note 72; Alex Robinson, New Awards Policy for Whistleblowers
Under Fire, LAW TIMES NEWS (July 11, 2016), http://www.lawtimesnews.com/
201607115518/headline-news/new-awards-policy-for-whistleblowers-under-fire.
77. See Robinson, supra note 76.
78. LAW SOCIErY OF UPPER CANADA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ch. 3.3-
1(2000).
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conduct,"79 "confidentiality and the solicitor-client relationship are [still]
paramount."8 0 Under the OSC program, "those who obtained informa-
tion in connection with providing legal services" can be eligible for
whistleblower awards, if "the whistleblower has a reasonable basis to be-
lieve that disclosure of the information to the Commission is necessary to
prevent the subject of the disclosure from engaging in conduct that is
likely to cause or continue substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the entity or investors." 8t This eligibility naturally conflicts
with the lawyer's duty to keep client confidences, and as securities lawyer
Jim Boyle says "including lawyers in the whistleblowing policy is simply
inconsistent with the integrity and ethical standards to which lawyers hold
themselves." 82 In fact, many of these concerns were raised by lawyers
during the OSC's "consultation process," but when the program was im-
plemented in July 2016, internal counsel were indeed included as eligible
for awards.83 Because of the program's conflict with the duty of confi-
dentiality, lawyers believe that it is "unlikely that any internal lawyers
could be whistleblowers, even if they are eligible according to OSC pol-
icy." 8 4 Nevertheless, the program is still likely to "create uncertainty for
lawyers" who work as internal counsel.85
Another issue that is likely to be problematic when the program is im-
plemented, is the lack of an internal reporting requirement. Without an
internal reporting requirement, "the new whistleblower policy gives com-
panies little opportunity to look into allegations internally before being
confronted with a high-profile investigation." 86 According to the OSC
policy statement, "employees can report misconduct directly to the OSC
without going to their supervisor or internal compliance officer."8 7
Therefore, without a proper internal reporting mechanism, companies are
more susceptible to blindside allegations.88 Securities litigator Lisa
Fuerst advocates for a program that would "require that a whistleblower
report internally or be able to provide a reasonable explanation for why
the whistleblower didn't," such as in situations when the employee fears
retaliation.89 Fuerst argues, similar to Justice Binne in Merk, that such a
program that "encourage[s] individuals to report first internally," would
benefit the company because it would provide "an opportunity to look at
the allegations, and if necessary conduct an appropriate internal investi-
79. Id. at ch. 3.2-6
80. Robinson, supra note 76.
81. Whistleblower Program, OSC Policy 15-601 at 9-10 (July 14, 2016).
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gation and decide whether there's any merit to them before the regula-
tors get involved."9 0
IV. CONCLUSION
While most would agree that "truly robust whistleblower legislation in
Canada is essential to preserving the integrity of [the] capital markets,"
not all agree on whether the new OSC program will be successful enough
to bring Canada in line with other nations.91 As explained above, securi-
ties litigators are skeptical of the program, and many cite the program's
vague "guarantees" and broad exceptions as being detrimental to its goal
of "chang[ing] the stigma of whistleblowing." 92 The OSC awards pro-
gram is definitely "a step in the right direction," but many of these
problems will have to be addressed before the program can fill the gaps in
Canadian whistleblower protection legislation.93
90. Id.; see Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 77, 2005 S.C.C. 70, at para. 23-24.
91. Obaidul Hoque, The Neglected State of Whistleblower Laws in Canada, ROCHON
GENOVA (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.rochongenova.com/blog/2015/11/trends-in-
whistleblowing-laws-across-canada.shtml.
92. Drew Hasselback, Ontario Securities Commission Will now pay up to $5 Million




93. Dias, supra note 86.
